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Abstract
This paper focuses on the relationship between social identity based on national, religious, or
international affiliations and attitudes toward foreign policy in the Turkish context. Evidence is
drawn from an original survey conducted among university students in Turkey. The results show
that students’ social identity has a significant correlation with their perceptions of foreign policy.
Most Turkish university students provide conditional support for the new directions in Turkey’s
foreign policy, but those with an Islamic identity appear to be more supportive of the Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi’s (Justice and Development Party) policies. Most university students believe that
Turkey’s future lies in the European Union and the Central Asian Turkic republics rather than in
the Middle East. Overall, the perceptions of educated youth toward foreign policy are shaped by
both social identity and their conceptions of national interest.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an was given a hero’s welcome in Turkey after he
stormed out of a meeting during a heated debate with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon
Peres at the Davos Economic forum in 2009. The event, known as the “one-minute
crisis,” was a reflection of Turkey’s foreign policy activism in the new millennium.1
This activism is usually attributed to the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, the Justice
and Development Party) and its chief foreign policy strategist Ahmet Davutog˘lu, who
became Turkey’s foreign minister in 2009.
The new activism in foreign policy is most visible in the government’s approach toward
Middle Eastern countries. The Islamic credentials of the AKP leadership combined with
the country’s increasing orientation toward this region have led some students of Turkish
politics to talk of the “Middle Easternization” of foreign policy2 or of a profound shift
“enacting neo-Ottomanism,”3 although others have argued that Turkey’s foreign policy
continues to be oriented mainly toward the West.4 One line of criticism of the AKP’s
foreign policy builds on the argument that a trend of Islamization is taking place in
Turkish society and that this is causing a shift from the West to the East in foreign
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policy orientation. According to some observers, the AKP is pursuing this shift in
order to appeal to a religiously conservative and nationalistic constituency and thereby
enhance its electoral fortunes.5 Some scholars explain the new foreign policy activism
as reflecting a broader trend toward the “democratization of foreign policy”6 and other
developments in domestic politics.7 These explanations are connected to a widespread
perception that public opinion has become highly significant in Turkish foreign policy
decisions.
In this article, which focuses on the preferences of domestic actors as one factor in
Turkey’s recent foreign policy shifts, I examine individual perceptions to test whether
and how social identity informs attitudes about foreign policy. The paper inquires into
social identities based on national, religious, ethnic, or international affiliations and
their relation to individuals’ opinions about foreign affairs. The focus of the research
was on the attitudes of university students, an important segment of Turkish society. The
analysis that follows draws on the results of an original survey I conducted among 800
university students in Turkey.
Studying students’ attitudes toward foreign policy is important for several reasons.
First, past research on the relationships between public opinion, identity, and foreign
policy in Turkey has been largely theoretical.8 Empirical research dealing with these re-
lationships is likely to enhance our understanding of them. Second, despite a widespread
perception that public opinion plays an increasingly important role in Turkish foreign
policy, previous studies have generally neglected the microlevel foundations of foreign
policy and have examined systemic and state-level factors.9 Third and finally, the political
attitudes of youth are not addressed adequately in Middle East studies more broadly.10
The significant role of educated young people in the Arab Spring suggests that the
politics of youth will continue to play an important role in the Middle East.
In the next section, I provide a brief survey of scholarly research on the recent
transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Then, I explore some theoretical insights
about the increasing salience of public opinion and social identity in Turkey in shap-
ing foreign policy. After developing a conceptual framework based on the notion of
multiple identities, I argue that social identity may be constructed in relation to either
the national context or the international environment.11 For example, ethnic, religious,
or national identities may exemplify the former and regional or global attachments the
latter. The distinction between nationally and internationally situated identities is utilized
to evaluate the findings from the survey. In the results section, I report students’ general
perceptions of international affairs and present the cross-tabulation of the data on the
relationship between social identity and foreign policy orientations in Turkey.
A N E W F O R E I G N P O L I C Y AC T I V I S M : T H E A K P E R A
During the Cold War, Turkey’s major foreign policy occupation was dealing with the
Soviet threat. The government’s alliance with the West and particularly its NATO mem-
bership provided security against the Soviets while distancing the country from Middle
Eastern and other neighbors. Despite moments of crisis,12 Turkey’s relations with the
major powers turned it into a Western “status quo power par excellence,” and Turkey’s
foreign policy during the Cold War is best “characterized as tactical, defensive, and
unimaginative.”13
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By the end of the Cold War, Turkey was already in search of a new role in an
increasingly globalized world order. Throughout the 1980s, Prime Minister Turgut ¨Ozal’s
neoliberal economic policies began to move the country from import substitution to
an export-oriented economy.14 In the early 1990s, the government attempted to gain
influence in Central Asia and the Balkans with no tangible success. In the same period,
the increasingly violent struggle with the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and
perceived threats from neighbors such as Greece and Syria led to a new security paradigm
steered by the military establishment. These external and internal threats produced a
feeling of insecurity, which in turn drove the increased use of hard power against the PKK,
leading some observers to define Turkey as a “post-cold war warrior.”15 Meanwhile, the
military-bureaucratic establishment chose to capitalize on a strategic partnership with
Israel during a time of slow progress in Turkey’s application for European Union (EU)
accession. Turkey was in search of a new direction in its foreign policy strategies and
according to some observers was “muddling through” the 1990s.16
The rise of the AKP to power in 2002 marked the beginning of a new era, though
the party’s foreign policies were not a complete rupture with the past.17 The shift was
first observed during ¨Ozal’s presidency from 1991 to 1993; examples include Turkey’s
increasing diplomatic and economic activities in Central Asia, the rhetoric of “From the
Adriatic to the Great China Wall,” and the government’s support for U.S. policies during
the first Gulf War.18 Later, amid the economic and political turmoil of early 2000, the
foreign minister of the coalition government, Ismail Cem, initiated a multidimensional
foreign policy strategy that aimed to strengthen relations with Turkey’s neighbors beyond
the EU. This trend continued with the AKP’s rise to power.
Ziya ¨Onis¸ and S¸uhnaz Yılmaz argue that Turkish foreign policy activism since the
end of the Cold War can be separated into three periods: a Western-oriented proactive
policy in the years immediately following the Cold War; an early period of AKP ac-
tivism characterized by Europeanization (2002–2007); and a later AKP period of loose
Europeanization and soft Euro-Asianism (2007–present).19 The last of these periods
has drawn considerable scholarly and political attention because it increased Turkey’s
involvement in the Middle East, leading some observers to conclude that the country was
shifting its axis by Middle Easternizing and/or Islamizing its foreign policy orientation,
a shift that some have framed as neo-Ottomanism.20 This does not necessarily imply a
total break with the West. For example, Tarık Og˘uzlu, citing Turkish foreign minister
Ahmet Davutog˘lu, asserts that “Turkey is increasingly capitalizing on its Eastern identity
with a view to securing its place within the West.”21 Larrabee similarly rejects the claim
that Turkey’s recent activism is an attempt to turn its back on the West, arguing instead
that it is a rational strategic attempt to adapt to a changing international environment.22
In a similar vein, Henri Barkey states that “for all the appearance of conflict with the
West, the fact of the matter is the AKP leadership was careful not to veer too far off
from established consensus. There was never talk of abandoning any of the Western
institutions Turkey belonged to.”23
Geopolitical concerns, new economic policies, and changes in the world system are
frequently invoked as the main frameworks for the AKP’s foreign policy shifts.24 As a
chief advisor until 2009 and foreign minister thereafter, Davutog˘lu has influenced the
AKP’s foreign policy decisions; indeed, his doctrine of “strategic depth” has been imple-
mented as Turkey’s foreign policy orientation.25 Corresponding to the weight assigned
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to the Middle East by Davutog˘lu, the AKP’s foreign policy strategies are most visible
in this region.26 According to his doctrine, foreign policy in the new world order should
be understood not as a set of bilateral relations but rather as a series of reinforcing and
interlocking processes. Davutog˘lu believes that in developing a long-term foreign policy
strategy, policymakers need to consider the “historical depth” and “geographical depth”
of their country. The former consists of the links between the country’s past, present,
and future and the latter of the complex relations between domestic, regional, and global
actors. Davutog˘lu’s notion of strategic depth encompassing a country’s geocultural,
geoeconomic, and geopolitical roles can be understood by looking at the intersection of
these two components. In this model, Turkey is considered to be a central country located
in the Afro-Eurasian landmass with a significant heritage of Islamic culture and Ottoman
history. With these unique geopolitical and cultural features, Turkey carries multiple re-
gional identities that make it European, Middle Eastern, Asian, Mediterranean, Islamic,
and Western at the same time. Based on this theoretical model, Davutog˘lu argues that
Turkey should maintain its traditional Western orientation with a strong Eurasian and
Middle Eastern component.27
Turkey’s image in the Middle East has changed significantly since 1997, when Turkish
president Su¨leyman Demirel had to leave a meeting of the Islamic Conference Orga-
nization early because of protests against Turkey’s alliance with Israel. At the same
conference in 2003, Abdullah Gu¨l received welcome remarks by the members of this
organization as the foreign minister of the most modernized and democratic Muslim
country.28 While this advance came at the cost of deteriorating relations with Israel,29
AKP’s proactive foreign policy strategies paid off in policies toward Cyprus and Armenia
and have helped Turkey to emerge as a regional power. It is within this international
context that public opinion and social identity in Turkey have gained salience in shaping
Turkish foreign policy.
P U B L I C O P I N I O N A N D T U R K I S H F O R E I G N P O L I C Y
In his seminal work, James Rosenau defines six factors that influence a country’s foreign
policy: individual factors, role factors, governmental factors, societal factors, relational
factors, and systemic factors.30 Students of Turkish politics have made invaluable contri-
butions by exploring some of these factors to explain foreign policy choices in Turkey.31
In this section, I focus on the linkages between public opinion and international affairs.
The influence of domestic actors and public opinion on a government’s foreign
policy is well established by international relations scholars.32 For example, there is
an extensive literature in the United States on how public debates have influenced
government decisions on the Vietnam War and U.S. involvement in the Middle East.33
In contrast, there is a paucity of studies analyzing the relation between individual
attitudes and international affairs in Turkey, even though numerous scholars have noted
how Turkey’s ongoing democratization process has increased the influence of domestic
actors on foreign policy.
The nexus of domestic politics and international affairs in Turkey can be viewed
in different ways. One plausible linkage between the two levels is the impact of the
increasing weight of international trade in the Turkish economy. Kemal Kiris¸c¸i employs
an economic approach to explain the recent transformation in Turkish foreign policy.34
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He argues that the emergence of a devout bourgeoisie, known as the “Anatolian tigers,”35
in electorally conservative provinces of Turkey and the related shift from a territorial
state to a trading state have put economic considerations at the top of Turkey’s foreign
policy agenda. Under these conditions, he argues, business circles may exert a greater
influence on the political elite than they did previously, helping to transform foreign
policy strategies.36 Kiris¸ci employs a multilevel approach that amalgamates individual,
governmental, and societal factors in one model.37
The increasing interactions between domestic and international politics are also high-
lighted by scholars who argue that the democratization of foreign policy has been a
characteristic of the AKP era.38 Ziya ¨Onis¸ argues that “civil society involvement in for-
eign policy initiatives became increasingly important and parallel to the democratization
of foreign policy. Public opinion matters assume greater weight in shaping key foreign
policy decisions.”39 Meliha Altunisik believes that since the 1980s, Turkey’s foreign
policy has been transformed into a “contentious and pluralistic” area, involving more
inputs not only from the bureaucracy and political parties but also from think tanks and
the broader public.40 In a similar vein, Meltem Mu¨ftu¨ler-Bac¸ contends that EU-related
reforms have improved democratization in Turkey, which in turn has opened avenues for
previously excluded groups to be more vocal and assertive in formulating their foreign
policy opinions.41
Whatever the causes, as the distinction between domestic and international politics
declines, two important consequences follow. First, foreign policy becomes a contested
issue to be exploited in domestic politics, either by economically motivated business
circles who want to influence policymakers or by politicians who seek to increase
their electoral fortunes by appealing to citizens. Second, and related, identity politics
gains greater weight in the formulation of foreign policy, whether through pressure
from the export-oriented Anatolian tigers affiliated with a religious, conservative, and
nationalistic identity or from political leaders who are forced to pay more attention to
the rising influence of new social groups.42
Overall, as Turkey has made significant advances toward democratization in the new
millennium, domestic politics have gained salience in foreign policy making. Domestic
politics may influence foreign policy formulations through many different avenues, in-
cluding political institutions, ideologies, electoral preferences, and economic structures.
In the next section, I look at the role of social identities on foreign policy preferences
and provide an empirical assessment by analyzing the attitudes of university students in
Turkey.
S O C I A L I D E N T I T Y A N D AT T I T U D E S T OWA R D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y
Og˘uzlu argues that the “Middle Easternization” of foreign policy may partly be attributed
to the increasing importance of Islamic identity in Turkey.43 Other observers agree
that there has been an identity shift in Turkey and that AKP leaders have been using
foreign policy to gain leverage with the electorate.44 This argument builds on the notion
of audience costs that force the AKP leadership to take into account the preferences
of a nationalistic and religious constituency when making foreign policy choices. As
evidence for this proposition, scholars frequently point to an influential study suggesting
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that a rising tide of religiosity and conservatism has recently been observed in Turkish
politics.45
Kardas¸ frames the connection between the AKP’s foreign policies and religious-
conservative ideology in a different way. He states that “the AKP’s reference to public
‘demand’ in many cases has an instrumental value allowing it to justify its foreign policy
domestically and deflect criticism from outside.”46 Aydın, too, disputes the primary role
of Islamic considerations in determining the AKP’s foreign policy preferences and
asserts that they are more likely to be used as a “cover.”47 These studies do not discredit
the role of identity-based and societal explanations for the recent shifts in Turkish foreign
policy; rather, they argue that this impact is utilized in an electorally pragmatic manner
by the AKP elite.
Whether social identity is used as a strategic cover or truly informs party strate-
gies, it is one of the factors exerting an influence on foreign policy, yet its content
and relation to international decision making need further study.48 In addition, the
distinction between identity, ideology, and political worldview is not always clear-
cut. Altunıs¸ık argues that different ideas on foreign policy choices represent political
worldviews about Turkey’s identity, interest, and future and that the debates over for-
eign policy are “intertwined with domestic power struggles and identity politics in
Turkey.”49
The complex structure of identity, ideology, and political worldviews leaves scholars
with an intricate web of relations shaping foreign policy choices. A person with a Muslim
identity may have a liberal worldview and may support an active foreign policy toward
the West rather than merely toward the Muslim world. A social-democratic and Western-
oriented foreign minister may promote policies that generate proactive involvement in
the Middle East as exemplified by Foreign Minister Ismail Cem (1999–2002). Given
the multifaceted nature of the relationship between foreign policy and citizens’ identity,
ideology, and worldviews, it is imperative to study identity as part of a complex social
reality.
In foreign policy analysis, scholars have examined identity in two ways. Some re-
searchers have employed the notion of state identity, defined as an overall orientation
of a particular state, in a comparative50 and Turkish foreign policy context.51 Other
students of foreign policy have utilized the concept of identity as a microlevel trait.52 In
what follows, I employ the latter approach, focusing on the relationship between social
identity and perceptions of foreign policy.
Tajfel defines identity as “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives
from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the
value and emotional significance attached to that membership.”53 According to this
definition, identity is best understood as a relational concept that has formative effects
on individual attitudes and preferences through a mechanism based on notions of in-
group and out-group. Individuals are likely to view the world through lenses that are
favorable for the group they are attached to and critical toward the group they perceive
as the other.54 Perceptions of in-group and out-group may become even more salient in
international relations than in domestic politics. Since international relations is defined
as an anarchic environment where political units are in a constant search for security,
individuals are likely to favor the nationhood they are attached to against other states
that may be viewed as threats to their national existence. Thus, citizens of a state are
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likely to construct a national identity based on the perceptions of others residing outside
their political territory.55
There is a rich array of social identities in Turkey related to national, ethnic, and
religious belongings. A Turkish citizen may feel affinity to categories such as Turk, Kurd,
and Muslim, among others. These different layers of social identity may not be exclusive,
and individuals may hold multiple identities at local, national, and international levels.56
Thoits and Virshup point to the existence of multiple overlapping identities, and they
differentiate between personal role-based identities, collective identities, and social
category identities.57 The Turkish case provides ample opportunities to examine such
multiple and overlapping identities.
The following analysis makes a distinction between domestic and international forms
of social identity. The former includes feelings about ethnic, national, and religious
attachments. The latter is related to how individuals define themselves with respect to
the regional and international position of their country. Given Turkey’s unique position
and the multiple state identities it holds, individuals may define themselves based on
the country’s geopolitical, geocultural, or geoeconomic position. An individual may
define his/her international identity to be Middle Eastern, European, or both. These
different layers and types of identity are likely to shape individual attitudes toward
foreign policy. Individuals will hold positive attitudes toward policy initiatives about
a region or people viewed as in-group. In contrast, they will have unfavorable views
toward policy initiatives that are incompatible with their identity and the perceptions
of their in-group interests.58 In addition to the in-group versus out-group dynamic, any
form of identity may be coupled with a political worldview, ideology, or a domestic
problem to inform individual choices.59
S A M P L E A N D DATA
To explore the relationship between social identities and perceptions of foreign policy, an
original survey was conducted among the students of Cumhuriyet University in central
Turkey.60 University students constitute an important segment of the electorate, tend to
act as opinion leaders, and are generally more active in political discussions compared
to older generations and uneducated citizens.
The questionnaire was designed as a computer survey and was conducted in the
computer labs of the university. This technique maximized the participation rate, and
a total of 800 students took the survey. A representative sample was obtained with
respect to gender; 49 percent (392 students) of the respondents were male and 51
percent (408) female. Although more than half of the students were chosen from the
College of Economics and Administrative Sciences (the college where surveys were
administered), the rest of the students were picked on a voluntary basis from other
colleges on the campus.61 The sample represents a balanced distribution of university
levels and socioeconomic status; 42 percent of the students reported being in their first
year, 14 percent in their second, 26 percent in their third, and 18 percent in their fourth
or higher year of education. Among all participants, 26 percent reported coming from
low-income, 14 percent from high-income, and the remaining 60 percent from middle-
income families. The regional distribution of the survey respondents’ origins was also
balanced; according to the responses, the 800 students originated from 75 different
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TABLE 1. Ideological preferences of students
Political Ideology Number Percentage
Marxist/communist 11 1
Social democrat 118 15
Center of left 26 3
Center left 15 2
Liberal 55 7
Democrat 136 17




Strong nationalist 31 4
Total 800 100
Note: The categories are selected based on the recommen-
dations of experts on Turkish politics working in the same
institution. Some categories were added after the pilot testing
of the survey.
provinces out of 81 in Turkey. Although 236 students (30%) are from the province
where the campus is located, the rest of the sample is fairly evenly distributed across the
regions.62
Special care was taken to offset the limitations associated with the use of a single
university campus. Campuses are political spaces where students are often engaged
in political activities.63 In the 1970s, leftist and nationalist students in Turkey utilized
campuses as sites of peaceful and violent political demonstrations. Starting in the early
1990s, Turkish campuses were divided over the headscarf controversy. Based on my
conversations with colleagues and students during the field study, I believe this campus
is not dominated by any political group. Furthermore, the selected sample demonstrates
considerable variability in terms of students’ political ideologies (see Table 1). The
largest numbers identified as Social Democrat (15%), Democrat (17%), Nationalist
(25%), and Conservative (11%). Some students reported stronger ideological positions,
including Marxist (1%), Islamist (8%), and strong nationalist (4%). Thus, I was able
to obtain a highly representative sample that allows me to make generalizations about
foreign policy orientations of university students in Turkey.
S T U D E N T S ’ P E R C E P T I O N O F F O R E I G N P O L I C Y S T R AT E G I E S
A N D G OA L S
I first report results related to the students’ general perceptions of foreign policy. The
participants were asked whether the foreign policy strategy of the current government
was on the right track, the wrong track, or neither. Of 800 respondents, 296 (37%)
believe that the foreign policy is on the right track, 249 (31%) believe it is on the wrong
track, and the remaining 255 (32%) take a neutral position. The educated youth do not
appear to provide unconditional support for the AKP’s foreign policy strategies.
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FIGURE 1. The perceptions of Turkey’s role in international relations.
One of the survey questions was: “In one word, how would you describe the identity
of Turkey in foreign policy?” The students then were given a list of identity categories.
Of 800 students, 47 percent described the country’s identity as “Turk,” 22 percent as
“Muslim,” and 11 percent as “Ottoman.” Those who believe that Turkey’s state identity
is “Western” or “European” add up to 11 percent, and the remaining 9 percent think of
Turkey as “Middle Eastern.” These results show that about half of the university students
view Turkey through nationalistic lenses. Those who view Turkey’s state identity as
Western or Middle Eastern constitute a small minority. Thus, in accordance with the
findings of past studies,64 state identity is perceived through a political–territorial lens
rather than through regional, religious, or historical frameworks.
The survey also included an item tapping into the respondents’ views of Turkey’s role
and goals in neighboring regions where Turkey pursues an active foreign policy. The
respondents were asked to specify whether they strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly
disagree, or are neutral about some statements (see Figure 1). For each statement,
positive responses (strongly agree and agree) and negative responses (strongly disagree
and disagree) are combined. As Figure 1 demonstrates, a very high percentage of the
respondents (73%) believe that Turkey should be a leader in the Middle East, followed
by 61 percent who support a leadership goal in the Balkans. One can argue that Turkey’s
historical legacy may be leading educated youth to favor an ambitious goal in the Middle
East and the Balkans, both former Ottoman territories. Since about half of the students
think that Turkey’s state identity is “Turk,” it may not be surprising that 57 percent agree
with the idea of political integration with the Central Asian Turkic republics. More
than half of the students (54%) agree that Turkey should be the leader of the Muslim
world, yet 28 percent of the respondents disagree with this goal. It is interesting that
support for EU membership is only 45 percent; 29 percent of the students oppose EU
membership. When the goals of Turkish foreign policy and Turkey’s leadership role in
international affairs are considered, the young and educated segment of Turkish society
gives more weight to nationalistic, historical (i.e., Ottoman), and religious affinities. It
seems that educated youth value increased involvement in the Middle East, the Turkic
republics, and the Muslim world, and that a majority believes that Turkey’s state identity
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should be defined in nationalist terms. So, what is behind these preferences about
foreign policy? Do different types of identity shape attitudes about foreign policy among
university students? In the next section, I try to answer these questions by reporting the
results of the survey questions related to individual identity and attitudes toward foreign
policy.
I D E N T I T Y A N D P E R C E P T I O N S O F F O R E I G N P O L I C Y
The survey included some items measuring social identity at the national and interna-
tional levels. Among many questions tapping respondents’ attachments, the following
two were selected for empirical analysis.65
Which one of the following describes you best?
Muslim Both Muslim and Turk
First Muslim then Turk Both Muslim and Kurd
First Muslim then Kurd Turk
First Turk then Muslim Kurd
First Kurd then Muslim Other




Both European and Middle Eastern
The first item measures social identity in a domestic/national context, while the second
asks about the respondents’ orientations with respect to regional and international at-
tachments. Therefore the first item is named a “national” identity in the results, while
the second item is labeled an “international” identity (see Table 2).
Table 2 shows that on the first question, related to the national context, 81 percent
of respondents describe their social identity as a combination of religious and ethnic
attachments. Among all participants, 39 percent report the best description of their
identity as “both a Turk and Muslim” and 3 percent report “both a Kurd and Muslim.”
In a similar vein, 28 percent of the respondents identify as “Muslim first and then
Turk” and 2 percent as “Muslim first and then a Kurd,” and finally 7.5 percent chose
“first a Turk/Kurd and then a Muslim” (7% Turk and 0.5% Kurd) as their primary
attachment. While multiple overlapping identities appear to be the norm, nationalist
and religious social identities are dominant among university students. Those who
define themselves solely by ethnic or religious identity are only 15.5 percent of all
participants (8% Muslim, 7% Turk, and 0.5% Kurd). On the second question, considering
attachments in an international context, the largest group is formed by those who describe
themselves as “global citizens,” while 33 percent of the educated youth feel that they
are both European and Middle Eastern. A larger number of respondents stated that
their international identity is only Middle Eastern (21%) than only European (12%).
Overall, the distribution of students across these two dimensions shows a good degree
of variance.66
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TABLE 2. Nationally and internationally oriented identity
National Identity International Identity
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Muslim 60 8 European 92 12
First Muslim then Turk 226 28 Middle Eastern 166 21
First Muslim then Kurd 19 2 Global Citizen 281 35
First Turk then Muslim 53 7 Both European and
Middle Eastern 261 33
First Kurd then Muslim 4 0.5
Both Turk and Muslim 314 39




Total 800 100 800 100
Note: The result from the cross-tabulation table: Pearson chi square (27) = 38.6117, Pr = 0.069. The
total percentage may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
Given respondents’ self-reported identity, what are their foreign policy preferences?
Do they support the AKP’s foreign policy vision? Where do they see Turkey’s future?
What are their preferences in relation to Turkish foreign policy? Figure 2 shows the two-
way distribution of students’ identity (national and international) and their beliefs about
their government’s foreign policy strategy. The bars show the percentage of respondents
who believe that Turkey’s foreign policy is on the right track, wrong track, or neither
(see Figure 2). The responses demonstrate that domestic social identities powerfully
inform preferences toward foreign policy. In particular, Islamic identity, whether on
its own or in conjunction with ethnic/national identity, is a strong predictor of support
for the AKP’s foreign policy choices. Overall, 37 percent of the students support the
current government’s foreign policy. To be more specific, as the right panel of the graph
demonstrates, 60 percent of those who describe their identity solely with reference
to Islam support the AKP’s foreign policy. A pattern of strong support is similarly
observed among those who define themselves as first Muslim and then Turk (43%),
first Muslim and then Kurd (53%), both Muslim and Turk (34%), and both Muslim and
Kurd (65%).67 In contrast, those who define their primary identity along ethnic terms
demonstrate somewhat weak support for the government’s foreign policy strategy. This
is especially true for those who describe their identity as solely Turk; 25 percent of
these students believe that the AKP’s foreign policy is on the wrong track. Overall,
a strong association exists between social identity in the national context and support
for the government’s foreign policy strategies.68 This relationship is more visible, as a
positive correlation, when a religiously informed identity is considered. However, no
clear and strong association is observed between identity in relation to the international
context and support for the AKP’s foreign policy. While those who consider themselves
both European and Middle Eastern and only Middle Eastern appear to be slightly more
supportive of the government’s policy, the differences with the other identity groupings
remain miniscule.
FIGURE 2. The identity and support for the AKP’s foreign policy. (a) Pearson chi square (6) = 2.7550, Pr = 0.839. (b) Pearson chi square
(10) = 79.6964, Pr = 0.000.
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TABLE 3. National identity and perceptions of Turkey’s future
EU Turkic World Middle East Muslim World Other
Muslim 35 27 15 23 0
First Muslim then Turk 30 34 18 16 2
First Muslim then Kurd 47 11 21 16 5
Both Muslim and Turk 34 38 8 17 4
Both Muslim and Kurd 46 4 12 31 8
First Turk then Muslim 32 40 11 10 8
First Kurd then Muslim 25 0 0 75 0
Turk 27 43 6 16 8
Kurd 50 25 25 0 0
Other 33 18 18 20 11
Note: Pearson chi square (45) = 82.6387, Pr = 0.001. Cell entries are percentages.










& Caucasia Total (%)
European 47 9 18 23 3 92 (12)
Middle Eastern 28 16 17 34 5 166 (21)
Global Citizen 33 11 19 33 5 281 (35)
Both European and Middle
Eastern 32 14 15 36 3 261 (33)
Note: Pearson chi square (12) = 17.0096, Pr = 0.149. Cell entries are percentages.
The previous results show that domestically oriented identity strongly informs support
for or opposition to the AKP’s foreign policy among university students. To be more
specific, Islamic identity alone and when prioritized within overlapping forms of identity
is significantly associated with support for the government’s foreign policy. While these
results cannot empirically substantiate an electoral connection or an elite–mass linkage,
they clearly show that students holding religious forms of identity demonstrate support
for AKP policies. This is an interesting insight from the results of the survey, but we
also need to examine whether a similar relationship is observed between identity and an
individual’s preferences for more specific foreign policy strategies.
In the survey, the participants were asked: “Where does Turkey’s future lie?” Ta-
ble 3 and Table 4 provide a cross-tabulation of respondents’ views about the future
of the country and self-reported nationally and internationally situated identities. The
percentages demonstrate a strong statistical association between domestically oriented
identity and perceptions of the future of the country’s foreign policy directions (see Ta-
ble 3).69 Across most identity categories, significant proportions of respondents believe
that Turkey’s future is either in the EU or the Turkic republics, while the proportion
of university students who believe that Turkey’s future lies in the Middle East and the
Islamic world is generally lower. It is not surprising that 43 percent of the respondents
who describe their identity primarily as “Turk” favor a future orientation toward the
Turkic republics. In a similar vein, a sizable proportion of individuals who define their
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primary identity as Muslim believe that their country’s future is in the Muslim world
(23%), though this proportion is lower than those who believe that Turkey’s future lies
in the EU (35%) or in the Turkic republics (27%).
The results in Table 3 combined with the other findings discussed previously show
that the association between social identity and youth’s perceptions of foreign policy
is multifaceted. First, most university students describe state identity in nationalistic
terms (i.e., Turkish). Second, a positive association is observed between support for the
AKP’s foreign policy and Islamic/ethnic identity. Third, when prescribing future goals in
international affairs, university students assign greatest weight to the EU and the Turkic
world. This last finding is particularly important; it shows that while religious identity
is correlated to greater support for the AKP’s foreign policy choices, most students see
Turkey’s future in the EU and the Turkic world. These two positions are not necessarily
at odds, because the AKP’s foreign policy activism relies on a geostrategic and realist
strategy while exploiting the geocultural identities unique to Turkey.
More interesting results can be seen in the cross-tabulation of perceptions of the
future direction of Turkey and internationally oriented identity (see Table 4). Across all
internationally situated identity groupings, the priority is given either to the EU or the
Turkic world. The EU is perceived to be the primary region for future policy strategies
by 47 percent of the respondents who identify as European, 28 percent who identity
as Middle Eastern, 33 percent holding a global citizenship identity, and 32 percent of
those who combine a European and Middle Eastern identity. The respective ratios are
very similar for the choice prioritizing the Turkic world. It is interesting that across all
international identity categories, the Islamic world and the Middle East are ranked lower
than the EU and the Turkic republics. For example, of those who hold a Middle Eastern
identity, only 16 percent believe that the future of Turkey is in the Middle East, compared
to a rate of 34 percent who see the future of the country in the Turkic republics.
C O N C L U S I O N
Turkey’s recent foreign policy involvement in the Middle East has drawn considerable
attention. A novel characteristic of Turkish foreign policy in the AKP era is the increasing
degree of interaction between domestic politics and international relations. As foreign
policy choices become more connected to the electoral fortunes of the political parties,
public opinion and individual choices gain more weight and identity becomes more
salient because of its capacity to shape individual preferences and attitudes. In this article,
I have examined the relationship between social identity and attitudes about foreign
policy in Turkey, utilizing data from an original survey conducted among university
students to empirically test this relationship. Despite some limitations, the empirical
analysis of the survey data reveals interesting insights about the association between
social identity and perceptions of foreign policy.
Most educated youth conditionally support the AKP’s foreign policy choices and
about one-third of them believe that the current foreign policy is on the wrong track.
While about half of the respondents (47%) define Turkey’s state identity as Turk, only a
small percentage (11%) of the students view its state identity as Middle Eastern.70 When
asked about foreign policy goals, significant numbers of respondents report that Turkey
should be a leader in the Middle East, the Balkans, or the Turkic republics. Individuals
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appear to be less enthusiastic about Turkey’s accession to the EU as a foreign policy
goal.
Moving beyond these general perceptions, the young and educated segment of the
Turkish electorate believes that Turkey’s future lies in the EU or the Turkic republics.
Only a small fraction of the respondents has an orientation toward the Middle East or the
Islamic world. It appears that individuals develop attitudes differently about the goals and
the future of foreign policy. When it comes to the former, most educated youth appear to
emphasize foreign policy strategies that are more in line with a nationalistic perception
of state identity. This view is compatible with Davutog˘lu’s strategic depth approach,
which favors a multidimensional policy exploiting multiple identities. Since Davutog˘lu
has implemented his foreign policy vision as Turkish foreign minister, the finding shows
that university students carry orientations that are in line with this theoretically inspired
policy framework. Furthermore, students’ orientations appear to be in line with the
scholarly approach explaining foreign policy activities with notions such as balance of
power, geopolitics, and economic interests71 rather than with accounts describing the
new directions in Turkish foreign policy as an axis shift or Middle Easternization.72
The results also imply that defining identity with respect to the national and inter-
national attachments has an instrumental value. This distinction helps us better predict
foreign policy choices among educated youth. Identity defined in terms of religious
attachments more strongly informs preferences about foreign policy than do internation-
ally oriented attachments. In particular, individuals who combine religious and ethnic
attachments to define their identity may be more likely to make use of these feelings in
forming their attitudes toward the AKP’s foreign policy. For instance, those who hold
an Islamic identity exclusively or in conjunction with ethnic identities are more likely to
support the AKP’s increased foreign policy involvement in the Middle East. At first look,
this finding may be taken as supportive of the claim that the AKP is serving the needs
of a religious constituency by Middle Easternizing Turkish foreign policy. However, the
results also show that respondents holding the same religious identity may be supportive
of active foreign policy in the EU, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Overall, the findings
from the survey suggest that an interest-based pattern of attitudes may be at work when
the future goals of Turkey are considered. It can be argued that the predictive power
of identity on attitudes toward foreign policy is conditioned by perceptions of national
interest. Scholars of foreign policy are still debating the role of ideas and interests in
foreign policy choices.73 The results presented in this paper show that attachments of
individuals to both multiple identities and national interest matter in shaping foreign
policy preferences. Students of foreign policy need to conduct more analyses to explain
the subtle ways in which identity and interest may interact to shape individual and state
choices in international affairs.
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